Xerox Multi-Function Device Security Target
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Copyright
2013 Xerox Corporation. All rights reserved.
ADV_FSP.2 Security-enforcing functional specification
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC_CMC.2 Use of a CM system
ALC_CMS.2 Parts of the TOE CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_FLR.3 Systematic flaw remediation (augmentation of
EAL2)
ASE: Security Target
evaluation
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample
AVA: Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis
6.6. Rationale for Security
Functional Requirements
Table 29 and Table 30 below demonstrate the completeness and sufficiency
of SFRs that fulfill the objectives of the TOE. These tables contain the
original rationale from IEEE Std. 2600.2-2009. Rationales for the SFRs that
have been added to this Security Target, that do not originate in IEEE Std.
2600.2-2009, have been added to these tables. Bold typeface items provide
principal (P) fulfillment of the objectives, and normal typeface items provide
supporting (S) fulfillment.
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